Norm Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention by Yuki Abe

Author:Yuki Abe [Abe, Yuki]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Social Science, Ethnic Studies, General, Regional Studies
ISBN: 9780429770777
Google: ePiADwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2018-12-21T03:45:06+00:00

France and the war in Bosnia

French engagement at the initial stage

As the EC troika viewed the crisis in the Balkans as ‘the hour of Europe’ (Chapter 3), the French government, a vocal supporter of the Maastricht Treaty, the conference which was due to be held at the end of 1991, thought of it as ‘a test for the CFSP’ and ‘an opportunity to demonstrate the community’s ability to hold a common line’ (Lepick 1996: 77). French leaders aimed to build the Community’s political and security system by dealing effectively with the conflicts in the Balkans.

In July 1991, less than one month after the outbreak of the first military clash in the former Yugoslavia, Paris set forth the idea of a WEU interposition force to Slovenia and Croatia for the purpose of ceasefire monitoring (Lucarelli 2000: 168) and, in September 1991, France, as chair of the UN Security Council, also proposed the creation of a WEU emergency force under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, a plan which reflected President Mitterrand’s intention to involve the WEU directly in this crisis. On this occasion, France declared that it was ‘prepared to bear the lion’s share of the military burden’ (Treacher 2003: 73).

After all, these French plans did not come to fruition because of Danish and Netherland objections in a WEU meeting and British objection in the UN Security Council, but it should be noted that France’s vision to evolve European security and to lead conflict management in the Balkans was reflected from the start. Indeed, Sonia Lucarelli’s (2000: 173) words are no exaggeration: ‘what Yugoslavia did offer was an opportunity that the French had been waiting for, to create a working operational European security structure that could undertake peace-keeping operations independently of the United States’.

After the war broke out in Bosnia and the situation rapidly deteriorated, it was decided to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation (UNPROFOR) in Sarajevo from June 1992. The French government immediately agreed on the dispatch of its troops, showing a clear contrast with other reluctant/cautious countries such as Britain, Germany and the United States. Its strong will to lead the international response was symbolised when President Mitterrand suddenly visited Sarajevo on 28 June under the ongoing siege. This trip was aimed to galvanise other European states by highlighting France’s presence in this war (Lepick 1996: 80), in which the government’s initiative was appreciated by the public (Morjé Howard and Morjé Howard 2003: 112). Furthermore, in the following month of July 1992, the UN mandate to monitor the embargo against the former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic Sea (United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757) was set in motion. France contended that this mission should be undertaken under the scheme of the WEU, whose post-Cold War rationale had just been outlined by the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 as peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis management.20 As this UN mission was explained in Chapter 3, some other countries (especially Britain) affirmed NATO’s role in consideration of their

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